Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 significantly changed one of the most important dynamics with the EU and NATO. Until then, policy toward Russia had been a fraught issue between the older Western European members and the more recent members from Central and Eastern Europe. While the former had prioritized economic relations, the latter had generally warned about the continued danger of Russian aggression. This debate had continued even after Russia’s first attacks on Ukraine in 2014. Since 2022, however, Europeans have finally acted in support of Ukraine, enacting several packages of economic sanctions. The Russia hawks saw their position vindicated, while the old Western power couple, France and Germany, have had to adjust theirs. This article examines this story of shifting power balances within the EU and NATO, applying a conceptual framework emphasizing political practice and persuasive ideas. It shows how the war has shifted the center of gravity in both organizations somewhat to the East, as Central and Eastern European countries speak with increased weight. However, the pendulum may well swing back soon, as most of these countries will find it hard broadening their policy agendas sufficiently to other issues. But most of all, several of the Central and East European countries may themselves be abandoning their old positions at the very moment they have won the debate over Europe’s Russia policy.
Kristian L. Nielsen (Mon,) studied this question.