The object of this study is the social relations arising from the infliction of harm to interests protected by criminal law as a result of a risky act caused by prior mental coercion. One of the possible reasons for the lack of relevance of criminal law norms regarding circumstances that exclude the criminality of an act in law application practice; the tendency towards a significant gap between the legal recognition of "new" circumstances that exclude the criminality of an act and their enforcement, is defined by the competition and transformation of these legal norms. The necessity to address the identified problem, to develop criteria for distinguishing circumstances that exclude criminality, including mental coercion and justified risk, emphasizes the relevance of this study. The aim of the research is to explore the relationship between mental coercion and justified risk using the activities of aviation and police as examples. The methodological framework of the study is based on universal dialectics, as well as a combination of general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction) and specific scientific methods (comparative legal, formal legal, structural-functional). As a result of the research, similar and distinctive features of justified risk and mental coercion have been identified, including those related to the execution of orders or directives in the activities of aviation and police. A conclusion has been formulated regarding the interconnectedness and complementarity of circumstances that exclude the criminality of an act, conditioned by their competition and transformation of these legal norms. The possible determining role of mental coercion as an independent circumstance that excludes the criminality of an act, or as a component of a group of norms of Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation leading to the commission of a risky act has been established. In the presence of such competition, the author agrees with representatives of the criminal law doctrine on the necessity of applying the constitutional "rule of doubts," which implies the use of criteria of permissible harm "most favorable to the perpetrator of harm."
Tamila Khavazhevna Alkhaeva (Thu,) studied this question.