The Conditionality Paradox: Assessing the Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of International Anti-Corruption Demands in Wartime Ukraine (2022–2026)

This mixed-methods dissertation investigates the efficacy and unintended consequences of international anti-corruption conditionality in Ukraine during the full-scale Russian invasion (2022-2026), examining what this study terms "the conditionality paradox"—the striking coexistence of strong formal compliance with conditionality requirements alongside modest aggregate governance improvement despite unprecedented international engagement. Drawing upon Principal-Agent Theory and compliance theory from international relations scholarship, this research analyzes how international actors—including the International Monetary Fund, European Union, and United States—deployed conditionality mechanisms to preserve anti-corruption institutions during existential military conflict, and how Ukrainian government actors and domestic stakeholders navigated, resisted, or selectively implemented these reform demands. Employing a convergent parallel mixed-methods design, the study integrates quantitative analysis of governance indicators (Corruption Perceptions Index, World Governance Indicators, IMF program data, NABU enforcement statistics) with qualitative process tracing of three critical episodes: the July 2025 National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) independence crisis, asset declaration verification system implementation, and contested anti-corruption position appointments. Semi-structured elite interviews (n=27) with Ukrainian officials, international organization representatives, Western diplomatic personnel, and civil society leaders supplement documentary analysis. Findings reveal that Ukraine achieved 100% compliance with IMF Quantitative Performance Criteria across all completed program reviews and successfully resolved the July 2025 crisis through coordinated international pressure within nine days, yet the Corruption Perceptions Index improved only three points (33 to 36) over four years. NABU demonstrated dramatic performance improvements during wartime—indictments increased 130%, conviction rates reached 90.3%, and economic impact nearly doubled—suggesting genuine institutional capacity building under extraordinary circumstances. However, the reform-by-crisis pattern documented in this study raises fundamental sustainability concerns regarding reforms that depend on external pressure rather than domestic political consensus. This dissertation contributes a novel theoretical framework for understanding conditionality effectiveness in active conflict contexts, challenges assumptions derived from peacetime reform and post-conflict reconstruction literature, and provides actionable policy recommendations for international actors seeking to optimize donor leverage in governance-critical assistance relationships with conflict-affected states.