The Northeast Atlantic is home to three large pelagic stocks—mackerel, herring, and blue whiting—which combined sustain one of the largest pelagic fisheries in the world. All three stocks undertake extensive seasonal migrations across the Northeast Atlantic, passing through different exclusive economic zones as well as international waters. As such they constitute what is referred to as straddling stocks, which according to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, are to be managed by regional fisheries management organizations. Over time, it has proved challenging to establish and retain international cooperation in these fisheries, and cooperative agreements that have been reached have frequently broken down. In fact, none of the fisheries is currently cooperatively managed. The purpose of this article is to investigate the reasons for this lack of stability in cooperative management of these fisheries. The analysis is founded on game theory, and the focus is on arrangements that may increase the likelihood of achieving stable cooperation.
Bjørndal et al. (Thu,) studied this question.