The international behavior of the Cuban regime has frequently been misinterpreted as either an ideological relic of the Cold War or the almost automatic reflection of its historical antagonism with the United States. While both explanations contain elements of truth, they are insufficient to account for the persistence, adaptability, and relative effectiveness of Cuban foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. To understand the deeper sources of this behavior, it is necessary to examine not only the ideological convictions that animate the regime but also the pragmatic calculations that have enabled a state with severe economic and military limitations to exercise a disproportionate degree of political and cultural influence within its regional environment. As has been previously noted, disbelief regarding how a small and poor country can exert such influence—beyond merely serving as a “revolutionary example”—extends even to those who dismiss any warning on the subject as “anti-communist paranoia.” What is often overlooked is that in an increasingly interconnected world, the factors and parameters of political influence have evolved. Small states can operate asymmetrically and creatively, without adhering to traditional demographic, financial, or military criteria. Cuba maintains a remarkable diplomatic presence—greater than that of many developed nations—capable of colonizing international organizations and forging extensive networks of influence agents within the political, associative, and intellectual communities of neighboring countries. To fulfill this task, unity and vertical command structures, temporal sustainability, and spatial expansion provide the Cuban state with influence far exceeding its limited financial and human resources.1 In this sense, Cuba constitutes a paradigmatic case of an asymmetric threat—an actor with scarce material resources and no significant conventional military projection capacity yet possessing a notable ability to intervene in the symbolic, ideological, organizational, and institutional spheres of other societies. This capacity does not arise from improvisation but from a sustained strategy that combines bureaucratic discipline, doctrinal coherence, and a keen understanding of the internal weaknesses of Latin American democracies. As George F. Kennan (1947) warned in his famous analysis of Soviet conduct, ideocratic regimes tend to interpret the international environment as a permanent field of struggle in which foreign policy is not an occasional instrument but an organic extension of the internal logic of power. In the Cuban case, this logic has remained remarkably stable since 1959, even as its forms and language have adapted to changes in the international system. The central question guiding this essay is twofold: (1) what ideological and pragmatic factors explain the international conduct of the Cuban regime? and (2) what concrete mechanisms does Cuba employ to deploy its influence across hemispheric societies and governments, thereby affecting the democratic quality of the region? To address these questions—while avoiding the highly specialized formats typical of academic hyperspecialization—I review the de-democratizing effects of this model and its mechanisms on Chavista Venezuela.2 The official ideology of the Cuban regime cannot be reduced to a simple adherence to classical Marxism-Leninism. From its origins, the Cuban Revolution articulated a doctrinal eclecticism that combined radical nationalism, anti-imperialism, state socialism, and a messianic conception of political power. This set of ideas crystallized into a doctrine of state—immune to alternation or plural deliberation—that defined politics as a terrain of permanent mobilization and existential conflict, where social organizations do not mediate between the state and citizens but rather function as extensions of political power. This conception has been exported, explicitly or implicitly, to other Latin American contexts through advisory missions, academic exchanges, and political cooperation. From this perspective, liberal democracy is not viewed as a legitimate alternative system but as a superstructure functional to capitalism and Western geopolitical dominance. Consequently, weakening it—whether through ideological critique, institutional erosion, or the promotion of “illiberal” or “antiliberal” models—becomes an objective consistent with the regime's worldview. One of the most persistent features of Cuban discourse has been the construction of a victimhood narrative centered on permanent siege. The US embargo, covert actions during the Cold War, and Washington's historical hostility have been integrated into a narrative that justifies both internal repression and external projection. Yet, as documented by various contemporary analyses—including those published by the think tank Gobierno y Análisis Político AC (GAPAC) (see Chaguaceda and Santos 2026; Chaguaceda 2025)—this narrative serves an additional strategic function; it allows Cuba to present itself as a moral reference point for Latin American audiences sensitive to the historical grievances of imperialism. In this way, the regime transforms its structural weakness into a source of symbolic legitimacy. This anti-imperialism, which is not limited to rhetoric, translates into a diplomatic practice aimed at building political coalitions, supporting allied governments, and legitimizing power-concentrating projects under the premise of “popular sovereignty.” Unlike ideological powers such as the Soviet Union, Cuba never possessed the resources necessary to sustain an expansive foreign policy in terms of global military or economic dominance. Its international activism has instead responded primarily to a regime-survival logic linked to direct regional influence and international diplomatic or propagandistic engagement. Every alliance, international mission, or diplomatic initiative has been evaluated according to its contribution to four central objectives, (1)securing external political support to reduce international isolation, (2) obtaining material or financial resources (subsidies, credit, cooperation), (3) reinforcing the ideological legitimacy of the Cuban model, and (4) fostering the emergence and consolidation of allied governments and regimes in Latin America, and to a lesser extent, across the Global South. This pragmatic rationality explains the regime's ability to adapt to changing contexts—from Soviet dependence to alliance with Venezuela, and from multilateral forums to transnational leftist networks. To operate within these contexts, the Cuban regime demonstrated an early understanding of what is now referred to as sharp power. Medical, cultural, and educational diplomacy have been systematically used as tools of political influence. Medical missions, university scholarships, and political training programs have enabled Cuba build networks of loyalty and gratitude across multiple countries. While presented as acts of solidarity, these initiatives are often accompanied by mechanisms of ideological control, political selection of beneficiaries, and the transfer of authoritarian practices. The threat posed by the Cuban regime does not lie in its ability to impose a model by force but rather in its capacity to erode democratic norms, practices, and consensuses from within Latin American societies and institutions. This threat is asymmetric for several reasons. First, it does not require large, immediate material investments as it frequently masquerades as cooperation, solidarity, or cultural exchange. Second, it relies on local actors and internal dynamics within the countries it seeks to influence. Finally, it operates over the long term, gradually and diffusely. As Kennan (1947) warned regarding Soviet influence, the danger lies less in frontal attack than in the progressive corrosion of trust in democratic institutions within target nations. Some of the principal mechanisms through which Cuba deploys this asymmetric influence in Latin America—and to a lesser degree globally—are (1) ideological diplomacy in regional and multilateral forums, (2) politicized medical and educational cooperation, (3) training of political and social cadres from allied movements, (4) institutional and security advisory services to allied governments, (5) influence within academic and intellectual networks, (6) strategic use of state and alternative media, (7) articulation with social movements and leftist parties, and (8) legitimation of authoritarian practices under democratic discourse. By defining ideological diplomacy as a state policy, the Cuban regime has demonstrated a remarkable ability to operate in regional and multilateral forums not as an isolated actor but as a normative entrepreneur. From the Organization of American States (OAS)—into which it symbolically reinserts without accepting its standards—to alternative organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP), Cuba has sought to shift the axis of debate away from liberal democracy toward diffuse notions of sovereignty, self-determination, and social justice. The primary objective of this activity is to normalize authoritarianism, increasing its appeal among broad sectors of influenced populations. Following a logic Kennan (1947) would have recognized as typical of ideocratic regimes, Cuban diplomacy avoids direct confrontation when unfavorable and prioritizes the gradual erosion of democratic consensus. In practice, it translates into ambiguous resolutions, nonbinding political declarations, and the construction of circumstantial majorities that relativize the centrality of human rights. The goal is not to impose a single model but to expand regional tolerance for illiberal or antiliberal practices, creating an “authoritarian lowest common denominator” acceptable in the name of stability or sovereignty. To achieve this end, Cuban diplomacy makes deliberate use of distorted political language. Concepts such as “participatory democracy,” “popular power,” or “socialist rule of law” function as empty signifiers, easily appropriated by governments with diverse trajectories yet useful for delegitimizing demands for pluralism, alternation, and accountability. This semantic displacement is among the most effective—and least visible—mechanisms of Cuban interference. International medical cooperation is perhaps the most well-known instrument of Cuban sharp power. Yet, its political dimension has been systematically underestimated. Medical missions not only provide health services in contexts of scarcity but also generate institutional dependence, build political capital for recipient governments, and reinforce Cuba's image as a morally superior actor. They enable the deployment of influence networks from within local communities—often impoverished and geographically isolated. The objective is not welfare per se but the accumulation of influence. The export of Cuban authoritarian know-how extends beyond ideology. It includes techniques of mobilization, social control, political intelligence, and crisis management. Through formal and informal advisory channels, Havana has shared practical manuals of political survival with allied governments. The Cuban experience—Venezuela being the most successful case—reveals how the authoritarian faction of a democratic country's political elite can embrace autocratic cooperation with a foreign authoritarian elite to prevail domestically—a form of colonization by invitation. Since the 1960s, Cuba has also offered scholarships and training programs to students and political cadres from Latin America. These experiences not only transmit technical knowledge but also socialize participants into a specific vision of power, social organization, and political legitimacy. The result is the production of “secondary elites” who, even without replicating the Cuban model exactly, incorporate a structural tolerance for authoritarianism and an instrumental view of democratic legality. The Cuba–Venezuela relationship represents the most complete example of this transfer. Beyond the oil-for-services exchange, a political-institutional symbiosis emerged; Cuba provided security and intelligence expertise, while Venezuela supplied material resources. This case illustrates how an asymmetric actor can amplify its influence by embedding itself within the state structures of a more resource-rich ally, conditioning the democratic trajectory of an entire subregion. Regarding influence in academic and intellectual networks, the Cuban regime—following a Gramscian intuition reinterpreted through an authoritarian lens—has systematically invested in the construction of cultural hegemony. Conferences, publications, academic networks, and debate spaces have served to legitimize its narrative and delegitimize criticism. Regional intellectual initiatives—such as the Network of Intellectuals in Defense of Humanity, organized from Havana, or certain working groups within the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO)—function as echo chambers for Cuban discourse, reproducing uncritically categories and diagnoses that minimize the regime's authoritarian nature. A central feature of this hegemony is the exclusion of critical voices, especially Cuban intellectuals and activists in exile or on the island, but also foreign critics of the Cuban dictatorship. This silencing is not always coercive; it often takes the form of moral disqualification (“agents,” “mercenaries”) that inhibits plural debate. Finally, in its strategic use of state and alternative media, Cuban influence has adapted to the digital ecosystem. Alongside traditional state media, the regime and its allies promote platforms that present themselves as “independent” or “counter-hegemonic” yet consistently reproduce aligned narratives. The objective is not persuasion but confusion, relativization, and polarization—undermining trust in democratic sources and professional journalism. A recurring theme is the claim that liberal democracy is incapable of resolving the region's social crises, thereby justifying a permanent state of exception and power concentration. As if all this were insufficient, Cuba has acted as a coordinating node for political networks that include parties, social movements, and civil society organizations. Through these alliances, authoritarian practices are reframed as legitimate expressions of popular will. Democracy ceases to be a set of rules and becomes an ideologically defined outcome compatible with the exclusion of dissent. The quarter-century of organized entanglement of the Cuban state apparatus within Venezuela's sociopolitical order—a phenomenon aptly described as colonization by invitation—offers a particularly clear illustration of this dynamic. The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela—particularly since Hugo Chávez's rise to power in 1999—constitutes one of the closest and most significant political bonds in Latin America over recent decades. The conduct of the Cuban regime in Venezuela cannot be explained solely by personal affinities between leaders but rather as a combination of ideological factors and pragmatic considerations that have guided deep cooperation across medical, political, institutional, security, propaganda, and economic domains (Blanco et This relationship has structural effects on the state and to the survival of the Cuban regime the of the Cold From an ideological perspective, the Cuba–Venezuela alliance on a shared vision of socialism, anti-imperialism, and of the Western Hugo Chávez's to power a strategic to the and the international that the Soviet central elements of Cuban political discourse, the of sovereignty, the construction of an external the United the of political power in the This ideological the of Cuban influence in sensitive of the state and enabled the international projection of the Cuban political model Latin America. Beyond ideological Cuban conduct in Venezuela has been by pragmatic Following the economic crisis of the Cuba severe of and financial resources. Venezuela, as an a strategic for the Cuban regime's economic Cuba to under in for professional services and technical advisory This highly for Cuba and enabled it to sustain its economic and political model for more than a the Venezuela support in where the state institutional One of the most of Cuban influence is medical cooperation, particularly through the of Cuban were in to provide primary to medical in this cooperation also political Cuban under in many in linked to political mobilization and social In this way, medical cooperation combined with of political and The training of political cadres under the Cuban model has been central of the of the United of Venezuela and training in Cuba in such as organization, political and power management. Cuban influenced the institutional of the of power, of to the and the weakening of These the transfer of a state model toward political In the of security and intelligence Cuba has provided technical and strategic advisory support to intelligence The of these toward the and of political developed in Cuba over decades. Cuban influence is also in the use of political propaganda, by state control, the construction of and the of the as an internal threat or foreign These practices have been central to the consolidation of Chavista power. between Cuba and Venezuela beyond to include sectors such as and professional this relationship structural dependence, particularly for to on The crisis this both regimes to reinforce political and diplomatic cooperation in the of international and external In the conduct of the Cuban regime in Venezuela is explained by the of ideological and pragmatic Cuba in Venezuela a for the projection of its political model and the of its economic survival while from Cuban in state control, political mobilization, and to international Medical cooperation, institutional advisory security propaganda, and economic a deep relationship that has Venezuela's political system and for democracy and in the From a central to (1947) Cuban strategy has in certain yet limited in It has in regional and authoritarian allies and Yet, it also structural economic and increasing international As have the of this influence as on Cuban as on the internal weaknesses of Latin American democracies. analysis with other international experiences Cuba's the international behavior of the Cuban regime with that of contemporary authoritarian powers such as a Yet, from a strategic the by Kennan is not the of material power but the between and Cuba with these regimes, (1) an instrumental conception of not as a set of rules but as a to political (2) the use of influence cultural, and over direct an (3) the of internal within particularly and the of political The central lies in While and deploy significant financial, and military Cuba operates as a normative in political advisory and Its lies in its material its influence is less and less and more to In such as Venezuela, Cuba's has demonstrated the of its asymmetric influence. Venezuela constitutes both an example and a for functional among a that the of authoritarian for the this Cuba acts as the of know-how and for internal control, the influence over intelligence, propaganda, and and as a model of authoritarian operates as a and with an on cooperation aimed at and military as serves as a of strategic and military influence in security, and geopolitical but with more limited into the of the on the and a pragmatic form of authoritarianism on credit, and of many Latin American external Cuba as a symbolic, or actor. This has been one of the of its influence. As Kennan (1947) ideological regimes not be by but by persistent In the Cuban case, strategic over in to the and of many in the the global authoritarian Cuba a specific function; it acts as a and of illiberal and antiliberal projects in Latin America. than it a of practices, and techniques that other actors adapt to This makes Cuba particularly in contexts of democratic or of institutions are and democracy is as incapable of social the Cuban an example of stability and the of this influence for the state of democracy in the Western democratic as the of Cuban often the power of the instead of the internal that it The Havana regime does by the region's democratic it these are and of social and institutional and ambiguous normative to human rights. From a perspective, does not in direct ideological confrontation but in the internal of democracies. institutions function and are through legitimate Cuban influence toward authoritarianism is functional to its democracy clear of pluralism, alternation in power, and human with no ideological Medical, and cultural cooperation initiatives be evaluated according to of and institutional The image of cannot as an to legitimize In the of the civil by the Cuban model, it is to support those of social demands and alternative ideas without to the authoritarian university and professional is a strategic influence is not through but through pluralism, and intellectual It is the international conduct of the Cuban regime is not the of or simple ideological It is the result of a by an authoritarian and toward regime survival in an environment that been In with the of Kennan it can be that Cuba does not direct confrontation with the it from within and primarily in covert objective is to gradually the terms of regional political debate and the centrality of liberal Its is its by its material but rather its strategic and historical by the of actors in the This strategy does not operate in a It is in Latin American societies by social with and persistent and democratic In this sense, the is also an the of regional The be the most of is not an but a that institutional and the that to be also be and
Armando Chaguaceda (Thu,) studied this question.