Traditional moral philosophy typically evaluates speech in terms of truth-value and intention, distinguishing between utterances that are truthful or deceptive, sincere or insincere. This binary framework, however, fails to account for a pervasive class of speech-acts that are factually accurate yet designed to mislead. This paper introduces and defends a new moral category—the unlie: a true statement spoken with the intention of producing a false belief in the hearer. By drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the moral psychology of intention, and structural models such as the Aristotelian square of opposition, the paper develops the Moral Square of Opposition, a fourfold taxonomy distinguishing truth, untruth, lie, and unlie. The analysis shows that the unlie is not reducible to lying, misleading, bullshitting, or paltering, but represents a structurally distinct form of truth-based deception. Recognising this category clarifies longstanding conceptual gaps in ethical theory and illuminates contemporary failures in political rhetoric, institutional communication, and interpersonal trust. The paper argues that acknowledging the unlie strengthens accounts of autonomy, responsibility, and the moral norms governing speech.
S. C. Sayles (Thu,) studied this question.