From the 1960s until the 2010s, Italy pursued closer ties with non-Western powers, including the Soviet Un- ion/Russia, while remaining firmly aligned with the West. This balancing act was an important feature of its desired ‘middle power’ status. However, Italy’s decreasing relative power and geopolitical competition have cur- tailed the already limited scope of international partnerships outside the West. This article challenges the argument that post-2022 Italian foreign policy is solely a tale of continuity. By zooming into Italy’s deteriorating relations with Russia, it argues that Rome abandoned an important aspect of its middlepowerness. This was part of a broader foreign policy line that – due to US pressure, Italy’s declining global influence, and decisions made by the country’s political leadership – led Italy to take a fully subordinate role to US foreign policy and diplomacy. In order to be considered a middle power, Italy would need to retain a degree of autonomy from the great power with which it is allied. Its inability to do this casts doubts on its presumed middlepowerness. Furthermore, Trump’s revision of US foreign policy in 2025 has posed a major challenge to Italy’s stance on Russia and the Russo- Ukrainian war, and revealed the fallacies of full subordination to Washington.
Siddi et al. (Sun,) studied this question.