ABSTRACT Inherited notarial monopolies function as institutional capture mechanisms, perpetuating colonial extraction across 29 postcolonial jurisdictions. Using cross‐national regression analysis of World Bank Governance Indicators and comparative case studies, this study examines 36 countries and reveals that monopoly regimes significantly underperform administrative systems regarding corruption control and transparency, while imposing property transfer costs 10–30 times higher than their counterparts. We introduce the concept of “professional colonialism” to explain how legal elites maintain extractive relationships through procedural complexity and credentialing rather than direct political control. Through institutional analysis of legislative records, archival documents, and structured elite interviews, comparative examination of Mexico, Singapore, Ontario, and Francophone Africa identifies three drivers of persistence: jurisdictional isolation, weak state capacity, and cultural framing. Puerto Rico serves as a primary case study; its hybrid sovereignty and archival records of the 1987 Notarial Act expose how professional networks utilize defensive lobbying and “anti‐colonial” rhetoric to protect rents. This study expands postcolonial theory by identifying professional groups as primary agents of colonial continuity.
Brown et al. (Sat,) studied this question.