African philosophers have shown a growing interest in the subject of disability, which is unsurprising for four interrelated reasons. First, disability is a major social and public health issue across the African continent, where a significant proportion of the population lives with disabilities, making the subject particularly relevant to African philosophers. Second, philosophy of disability has developed into a distinct and coherent field, prompting African philosophers to contribute to its discourse. Third, African philosophy has long engaged with issues of injustice, including the historical denial of African indigenous people’s personhood, knowledge, and rights. Since disability entered academia through the lens of injustice, it aligns naturally with African philosophical concerns. Fourth, disability discourse remains predominantly shaped by voices from the Global North, creating a demand for more diverse perspectives, a demand to which African philosophers are increasingly responding. Despite this growing engagement, these contributions are not yet recognised as forming a distinct field within philosophy. Instead, they are often absorbed into the broader domains of the philosophy of disability, Disability Studies, or African philosophy. This article addresses this gap by demonstrating that African philosophical reflections on disability, ranging from conceptual analyses to discussions of its relationship to justice and moral status, collectively justify the identification of an emergent subfield of African philosophy of disability. It further proposes directions for developing this subfield into a more clearly defined and robust area of study.
Ntobeko Shozi (Tue,) studied this question.