G\"odel's incompleteness theorems establish that no sufficiently expressive system can internally contain a complete and consistent description of its own total structure. This paper examines the structural consequences of that prohibition for self-representing systems. We define incomplete descriptions as representations that omit regress-inducing self-referential structure, and show that such descriptions are structurally admissible even where complete self-containment is not. From this we identify a constructive asymmetry: internal completeness is prohibited, while external incompleteness is permitted. We show that incomplete descriptions can representationally contain the systems that generate them without contradiction, and analyse the conditions under which a system may adopt such a description as its operative representational frame. The result is a purely structural account of containment without regress, independent of ontology, physical implementation, or cognitive interpretation. The argument proceeds by isolating the G\"odel boundary, defining admissible incomplete descriptions, and analysing the conditions under which such descriptions may be adopted as operative frames without contradiction.
Michael Hitchcock (Sun,) studied this question.