Artificial Intelligence, Regulation, and Separation of Powers

The growing incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) into state regulatory frameworks has prompted substantial constitutional and legal enquiries. One of these questions is whether the assignment of regulatory monitoring to self-learning algorithms aligns with the conventional idea of separation of powers. The nondelegation theory prevents lawmakers from giving their lawmaking authority to administrative agencies or other groups without clear instructions, historically serving as a safeguard against giving away too much government power. As governments begin using AI systems for regulatory decision-making or assistance, concerns emerge surrounding accountability, transparency, and constitutional validity. This study looks into whether allowing self-learning algorithms to handle regulatory monitoring goes against the basic ideas of the nondelegation doctrine. The study contends that, through doctrinal legal analysis, constitutional theory, and emerging technological governance frameworks, although AI tools can assist in administrative decision-making, the unrestricted delegation of regulatory authority to autonomous systems jeopardizes democratic accountability and the separation of powers.