Abstract The resurgence of virtue ethics in the last 50 years has often been guided by Aristotelian approaches. Recently, however, several scholars have attempted to develop an ethics of virtue inspired by Hume. One element that hindered the development of full-fledged Humean virtue ethics is the lack of a Humean account of something akin to phronesis or practical wisdom. In this paper, I propose an account of practical wisdom inspired by Hume. I argue that such an account avoids implausible ontological commitments of Aristotelian approaches, while preserving a role for practical wisdom in our moral life. In Sect. 2, I identify two important functions that phronesis plays in Aristotelian accounts. While some Humeans contend that practical wisdom is not an essential element of virtue ethics, in Sect. 3, I argue that Humean virtue ethics needs something like phronesis to be a plausible normative view. In Sect. 4, I reconstruct four proposals for what could play the role of phronesis in Humean virtue ethics. In Sect. 5, I evaluate the effectiveness of these proposals against the two identified functions of phronesis and argue that the most promising candidate for practical wisdom in Humean virtue terms is a set of features possessed by a sensible , sensitive , experienced , knowledgeable , and unprejudiced person.
Enrico Galvagni (Fri,) studied this question.