Purpose This paper examines whether, when and how non-family managers can appropriate value from socioemotional wealth (SEW) in family firms. While SEW is typically treated as a source of value creation for the owning family, I distinguish between value creation and value appropriation and apply a property rights perspective to examine how ambiguity in SEW's control rights shapes non-family managers' ability to capture its benefits. Design/methodology/approach This study develops a conceptual framework that integrates the property rights theory with the SEW perspective. I theorize SEW as a bundle of property rights and distinguish between dimensions that are broadly accessible to firm stakeholders and those that are primarily reserved for family members. Drawing on prior research on control hazards and governance in family firms, I develop propositions explaining how reliability, egocentrism and succession hazards constrain non-family managers' ability to appropriate SEW value, and how governance mechanisms can mitigate these constraints. Findings I propose that SEW is not a monolithic resource but varies in its appropriability by non-family managers. Universal SEW dimensions, such as firm identification and external stakeholder relationships, are more accessible to non-family managers and associated with greater value appropriation. In contrast, family-focused SEW dimensions, including family control, transgenerational control and intra-family emotional ties, present greater property rights hazards that limit non-family managers' ability to capture value. Governance mechanisms can weaken these hazards and expand non-family managers' access to family-focused SEW. Research limitations/implications This paper considers whether, when and how non-family managers can appropriate value from SEW in family firms. While SEW is typically treated as a source of value creation for the owning family, I distinguish between value creation and value appropriation and apply a property rights perspective to examine how ambiguity in SEW's control rights shapes non-family managers' ability to capture its benefits. Originality/value This study reframes SEW as a contested resource rather than an asset exclusively benefiting family owners. By integrating the property rights theory with the SEW perspective, it offers a novel explanation for variation in non-family manager outcomes across family firms. The paper advances theory by clarifying when SEW can serve as a source of attraction and retention for non-family managers, thereby linking SEW preservation to family firm longevity and survival.
Christopher R. Penney (Sat,) studied this question.