The Problem of Criteria for Judging Interpretive Inquiry

Over the years various interpretive (or qualitative, naturalistic, etc.) investiga­ tors have been concerned with develop­ ing criteria for judging, and defining pro­ cedures for doing, this type of investiga­ tion. Apparently the aim is to establish some set of foundational criteria to sepa­ rate the good interpretive study from the not so good. These criteria and procedures would help advocates of this approach refute charges of subjectivity and allow them to lay claim to that certitude that is available, at least as it is generally pre­ sumed, to their quantitatively oriented counterparts. Given the assumptions con­ ventionally made to distinguish interpre­ tive from quantitative inquiry, this paper takes the position that the quest for foun­ dations may be a misguided one. If the assumptions and their implications are taken seriously, arguments that attempt to establish such nonarbitrary criteria and/or procedures will, perhaps inevita­ bly, be marked by confusion and incon­ sistency. To defend this contention, this paper will begin with a brief historical overview of the issue. This discussion will then be followed by a specific example of the problem and an examination of why inconsistency mars our attempts to de­ velop criteria given certain assumptions.