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This article takes a close look at the landscape of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing. It is well known that automated identification system (AIS) spoofing can be used for electronic warfare to conceal military activities in sensitive sea areas; however, recent events suggest that there is a similar interest of spoofing AIS signals for commercial purposes. The shipping industry is currently experiencing an unprecedented period of deceptive practices by tanker operators seeking to evade sanctions. Last year’s announcement of a price cap on Russian crude oil and a new ban on Western companies insuring Russian cargoes is setting the stage for an increase in illegal activity. Our research team identified and documented the AIS position falsification by tankers transporting Russian crude oil in closed ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfers. The identification of the falsified positions is based on the repeated instances of discrepancies between AIS location suggestions and satellite radar imagery indications. Using the data methods at our disposal, we reconstructed the true movements of certain tankers and encountered some surprising behavior. These false ship positions make it clear that we need effective tools and strategies to ensure the reliability and robustness of AISs.
Androjna et al. (Tue,) studied this question.