Methodological Nationalism is Not the (Best Articulation of the) Problem

Abstract Political philosophy has long been criticised for its state-centricity. A recent version of this objection asserts that the discipline perpetuates a problematic methodological nationalism. Critics argue that political philosophers are widely disposed to interpret political phenomena from the perspective of the nation-state, and that this is detrimental to normative theorising. In this paper I argue that the objection to methodological nationalism should be dropped, at least in its current form. Specifically, I reconstruct three variants of the objection, and – borrowing insights from the ‘hard’ sciences and Elisabeth Camp’s account of perspectives – ultimately show that methodological nationalism is not the kind of thing that can be decisively objected to in a widely-persuasive manner. Therefore, I recommend that sweeping objections to nation-state-centricity be generally replaced with traditional targeted analysis of specific claims made in specific contexts. Despite the fine-grained nature of this approach, I show that it remains a fruitful way of addressing pervasive problems in the discipline.