Weapons of Mass Deterrence: How Nuclear Threats Succeed

Abstract Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 has put nuclear security back in the spotlight, especially through Russian nuclear threats intended to undermine and deter European arms delivery to Ukraine, ranging from battle tanks to cruise missiles to fighter jets. While a growing body of literature has examined the conditions under which nuclear weapons use is publicly endorsed, surprisingly little is known about the recipient effects of nuclear threats. We argue and demonstrate that such threats can deter populations in the target state, instill fears of escalation, and induce public preferences for security policies of restraint. To understand the mechanisms of why and how nuclear threats succeed, we devise a large-scale public opinion survey in Germany, centering on the debate on military support to Ukraine—which Russian nuclear threats seek to deter. Our findings demonstrate that (i) large shares of the public deem Russian nuclear threats as credible, and that (ii) perceived credibility exerts a strong negative effect on public support for the delivery of modern weapon systems to Ukraine, suggesting that nuclear coercion can work indirectly, by shaping the domestic constraints within which democratic leaders operate. Finally, we find that nuclear threat capability is remarkably resistant to experimental manipulation.