Land expropriation remains an important instrument for industrialization and urbanization in developing countries, but its extensive use often generates fiscal dependence, social conflict, and governance strain. This article argues that these outcomes are rooted in the political and economic logics embedded in land governance. Using China’s rural collective land expropriation as the principal case, it traces how a century of institutional change produced a system that serves both political consolidation and economic accumulation. This configuration has fostered path dependence on land-based revenue, expanded the scope of expropriation, distorted the distribution of land value gains, and marginalized affected farmers. The article further argues that reform requires coordinated adjustment in four dimensions: narrowing expropriation to genuinely public purposes, aligning it with the market entry of collectively owned commercial construction land, moving compensation toward a more market-relevant standard, and strengthening procedures around participation, disclosure, and review. Together, these reforms offer a more systematic path for transforming land expropriation from a development tool into a mechanism of sustainable governance.
Hua et al. (Fri,) studied this question.