This article examines the U.S. presidents’ securitization and desecuritization of post-revolutionary Iran. Employing securitization theory as its theoretical framework and qualitative content analysis as its research method, it analyzes 104 paramount instances of U.S. presidential rhetoric including State of the Union addresses, speeches delivered during the United Nations General Assembly's General Debates, and National Security Strategy reports. The analysis shows how successive U.S. presidents have framed Iran as an existential threat across multiple security sectors—military, political, societal, economic, and emerging cybersecurity—to justify their extraordinary policies regarding the country. A key finding of the research is the distinction between U.S. presidents’ securitization of the Iranian state and the Iranian nation, which first emerged during George W. Bush’s first term. Moreover, the study identifies both continuity and change in U.S. securitization and desecuritization of Iran over the past four decades, conceptualizing them into two overarching frameworks: the Realist approach and the Constructivist approach. This research introduces the novel concept of Positive Securitization, or Desecuritizing Securitization, as a new addition to the theoretical framework of securitization theory, and highlights its application during the Obama administration. Positive securitization refers to the use of securitizing discourse to justify the desecuritization of dialogue and political engagement within a specific context. It does so by claiming that even extreme exceptional measures—military or economic—would prove inadequate in addressing a perceived threat, thereby presenting diplomacy as the only viable solution. The article offers a comprehensive exploration that provides a detailed understanding of U.S. presidential rhetoric and the gradual construction of Iran’s image as a threat.
Mohammadyari et al. (Wed,) studied this question.