This article examines the institution of criminal attempt in Old Georgian criminal law through the analysis of the legal monument known as the Law of Bagrat Kouropalates. Given the ongoing scholarly debate concerning the dating of this legal text, the article briefly addresses the issue of its chronological attribution. Particular attention is paid to the existence of the principle of subjective imputation in Old Georgian criminal law, within which the concept of criminal attempt is examined. The main objective of the article is to demonstrate the progressive nature of Old Georgian criminal law, especially in its reliance on subjective imputation as a basis for determining criminal liability. Although the study focuses on the legal history of Georgia, it contributes to broader discussions in European legal history by offering insight into the development of criminal liability and culpability during the ninth and tenth centuries. The article may therefore be of interest to scholars concerned with the historical foundations of criminal law. The findings contribute to European legal historiography by demonstrating that sophisticated concepts of criminal culpability were already present in ninth-century Georgian law. The significance of this inquiry is not limited to doctrinal legal history. The way a legal culture distinguishes between mere intention, preparation, attempt, and completed offense reveals broader assumptions about moral blame, social order, and the relationship between inward culpability and outward harm. In this respect, the law of Bagrat Kouropalates is valuable not only as a Georgian legal monument but also as evidence of the cultural and ethical foundations of medieval criminal liability. Examining criminal attempt through this lens makes it possible to situate Old Georgian law within wider interdisciplinary discussions concerning law, morality, and legal consciousness in premodern societies.
Nino Zhvania (Thu,) studied this question.