Commentary: Divergent thinking is not synonymous with creativity.

On several occasions I have suggested that a modified scientific method be used in studies of creativity (Runco, 1994a, 1999, 2006). This is a fairly contrarian suggestion because it implies a less-than-maximally objective perspective. Yet creativity will never be fully understood using the traditional scientific approach. This is in part because creativity requires originality, and the novelty that signifies originality is typically unpredictable, or at least not predictable with much precision. Perhaps more important for a modified scientific approach is the fact that creativity depends on affect, intuition, and other processes which cannot be accurately described using only objective terms. Yet at the same time, we should be as objective as possible. And although I am intrigued by generalizability theory, as described by Silvia, Winterstein, Willse, Barona, Cram, Hess, Martinez, and Richard (2008), I am concerned about their decision to use subjective scoring of divergent thinking tests. Their rationale is weak, to be blunt about it, and they have overlooked some critical research on the topic. In this Commentary, I could describe the attraction of generalizability theory, but Silvia et al. do a more than adequate job of that. So instead, I will try to fill some gaps in their review of the research on divergent thinking. I also have a few questions with several of their claims and methods. The most general problem is apparent in the title to their article. It implies that they can assess creativity with divergent thinking. I thought that idea was rejected about the same time as Woodstock—nearly 40 years ago. Wallach (1970) put it very well when he described divergent thinking tests as predictors rather than criteria of creative performance. I elaborated somewhat and defined divergent thinking tests as “estimates the potential for creative problem solving” (Runco, 1991b). This view, emphasizing tests as estimates and potential instead of guaranteed creative behavior, is very different from that which equates divergent thinking and actual creativity. This is not only a problem with the title. Silvia et al. (2008) also state that “a straightforward interpretation is that a creative response is a unique response” and “divergent thinking is the most promising candidate for the foundation of creative ability. ” These quotations are both much too close to equating divergent thinking and creative ability, and to make matters worse the latter implies that one candidate for creative ability would be feasible and desirable. More realistic views describe creativity as a complex or syndrome (MacKinnon, 1965; Mumford Runco, 2004). Part of the problem may be that Silvia et al. (2008) rely on earlier reviews and criticisms of divergent thinking. In fact, they cite the criticisms of Sawyer (2006) and Weisberg (2006) when they wrote that “it would be surprising, given the advances in psychometrics and assessment over the last 40 years, if the old ways were still the best ways. ” If they do not like the old ways, why are they relying on old research? Sawyer (2006) and Weisberg (2006) are excellent scholars and their books both published in 2006. Yet, Sawyer (2006) contains two citations to empirical research on divergent thinking. Weisberg’s (2006) volume is very well researched, but it too does not capture any where near a representative sample of the more recent research on divergent thinking. It cites empirical studies on divergent thinking from 1953, 1965, 1972, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1999, and 2004. The first two of those could be disregarded because of their age, but they are classics by Guilford and Wallach and Kogan—and both support the validity of divergent thinking tests. The last two also clearly support the use of divergent thinking tests. The 1999 study is a reanalysis of Torrance’s longitudinal data, using structural equation modeling. It supported the validity of the traditional objective scoring system (fluency, originality, flexibility, elaboration) ! In particular, “results suggest that just under half of the variance in adult creative achievement is explained by DT test scores, with the contribution of DT being more than 3 times that of intelligence quotients” (Plucker, 1999, p. 103). The 2004 study also supported the validity of divergent thinking, though it used the less well-known Urban test (TCT-DP). Quoting the conclusion from this study, “factorial validity and relations to consensual assessments supported convergent and discriminant validity of the TCT-DP. The TCT-DP also correlated significantly with other creative products—the individuality of photo essays and rated creativity of TAT stories” (Dollinger, Urban, McRae, 1987). Silvia et al. (2008) quote one other review on (a) the relationship of divergent thinking with intelligence, and (b) the predictive validity of divergent thinking tests. The first of these is a complicated issue because of differences among tests of divergent thinking and intelligence (Kim, 2005; Runco there is discriminant validity. When there is a relationship between intelligence and divergent thinking, it is not of a magnitude that suggests that they are redundant, only that they are related. And this makes perfect sense, given theories of creativity and intelligence. Often some of the latter is necessary for the former. As for predictive validity, a slew of studies has Mark A. Runco, California State University, Fullerton, and the Norwegian School of Economics & Business Administration. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark Runco, CSUF, PO Box 6868, Fullerton, CA 92734 USA. E-mail: runco@fullerton. edu Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association 2008, Vol. 2, No. 2, 93–96 1931-3896/08/12. 00 DOI: 10. 1037/1931-3896. 2. 2. 93