Dictators are notoriously untrustworthy allies, often seeking to consolidate power at the expense of their own supporters. While some ruling coalitions are too weak to resist this, others possess the capacity to push back. Why, then, do these powerful elites often fail to prevent personalization? This study argues that strong elites face a collective action problem when resisting the dictator. Given their strength, as long as one of them resists, the autocrat’s power remains constrained, benefiting all members of the ruling coalition. This creates an incentive to free ride. Elites let other regime members do the work of resisting, hoping to capture the benefits of power sharing without having to pay the costs of confrontation. As more elites fall for this calculus, inaction becomes inevitable, enabling dictators to consolidate power. Contrary to the prevailing view, power sharing does not always constrain autocrats. Depending on how dictators share power, they may create strategic incentives that facilitate personalization.
José Kaire (Fri,) studied this question.