Readjusting imagined markets: morality and institutional resilience in the German and British bank bailout of 2008

Why was there no fundamental change of financial regulation after the 2008 credit crunch? This article argues that the limited regulatory changes of German and British financial markets can be explained by the influence moral boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate financial practices had on policymakers' crisis perception. In German public debate of 2008, speculation as opposed to firm investment was seen as cause of the crisis. The British crisis narrative held illegitimate profits responsible that were gained from excessive risk-taking as opposed to risk management. These distinct legitimizing patterns (a) fostered a selective perception of the crisis that downplayed domestic structural causes of the crisis, and (b) directed regulatory efforts away from fundamental reforms. In fact, both national debates saw the institutional regime of their financial markets re-affirmed by the crisis and in need of readjustment. Conceptually, the article shows the affinity between public moral boundaries of legitimate economic practices and the core institutional principles of market regimes.