System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu

Abstract This paper presents "strategic hedging" as a way to conceptualize much of the strategic behavior currently employed by second-tier states like China, Russia, Brazil, and France. Hedging is an alternative to strategies like balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Like those other strategies, hedging is driven by structural incentives associated with the current polarity of the international system and power concentration trends within it. Hedging will be most prevalent in international systems that are defined by a leading state that, while in a position of power preponderance, is also in the process of relative decline. Strategic hedging behavior is effective for second-tier states in such deconcentrating unipolar systems because it avoids outright confrontation with the system leader in the short term, while still increasing the hedging state's ability to survive such a direct military confrontation should it occur in the long run. Strategic hedging behavior can also be used to insure the hedging state against security threats that might result from the loss of public goods or subsidies that are currently being provided by the system leader. In this article, I define strategic hedging behavior, present a mechanism for identifying empirical evidence of strategic hedging, and apply that mechanism to three case studies: the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Brazil's approach to regional leadership, and French opposition to the 2003 us invasion of Iraq. Acknowledgments Brock F. Tessman is an assistant professor of International Affairs and associate director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues (Globis) at the University of Georgia. He has published work on the foreign policy strategies and conflict behavior of major powers in a number of journals, including International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Asian Security, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. He is also interested in political simulations and has published a simulation textbook under the title International Relations in Action: A World Politics Simulation (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). The author would like to thank Patricia Sullivan, Darius Ornston, Markus Crepaz, T. V. Paul, William Wohlforth, Robert Pape, and other members of the "Soft Balancing and International Relations" panel at the 2010 Meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans (17–20 February 2010) for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. The author is also grateful to the careful feedback provided by anonymous reviewers at Security Studies and for the research assistance provided by Sarah Fisher, Holger Meyer, and Leah Carmichael. Notes For the purpose of this analysis, "second-tier states" are those countries (with the exception of the system leader) that enjoy major power or regional power status. The role of conditioning factors may be similar to the domestic and individual-level variables that neoclassical realists use as complements to power-based explanations of foreign policy. For more on neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–72; and Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). This might be even more likely if the second-tier state "B" considers the current system leader "A" to be relatively benign in contrast to threatening, rising power "C". This hypothetical scenario might be particularly relevant to the actual strategic choices made by second-tier states like Japan, which may very well perceive greater threat from a rising China than from the United States. Of course, some conditioning factors may serve to reinforce the core strategy. It is also important to note that multiple conditioning factors are likely to influence strategic choice simultaneously in any given situation. If those factors act as countervailing vectors, they will offset each other and the state will continue to find the core strategy to be most appealing. Other conditioning factors may also come into play: economic interdependence with a rising system leader in a concentrating multipolar system may lead a second-tier state to favor bandwagoning over balancing. In a deconcentrating multipolar system, the same factor may push states to engage in a certain type of strategic hedging rather than buck-passing. Specific interpretations will depend on assumptions about the relationship between interdependence and war. See Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 5–41. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 475–93; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Polarity, Preponderance and Power Parity in the Generation of International Conflict," International Interactions 13, no. 3 (1987): 225–62; and William R. Thompson, "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 4 (December 1986): 587–615. For the purposes of this comparative analysis, I allow the conceptual umbrella of multipolarity to cover bipolar systems as well as more traditional multipolar systems with three or more concentrations of power. The tendency toward balancing behavior is highlighted as a core element of the structural realist approach to international relations. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Waltz went on to predict that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, new balancers would emerge to challenge the United States. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5–41. The distinction between internal and external balancing is originally captured by Waltz, but it is important to note that Waltz saw balancing as an automatic international outcome, not a conscious, manually driven foreign policy strategy. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For differences between manual and automatic balancing, see Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). The security-enhancing effects of nuclear deterrence are outlined well by Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Stephen Walt expands upon the logic of balancing, but argues that states are unlikely to balance against capability concentration if that concentration is not threatening due to geographical, ideational, or other circumstances. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). For more recent application to us foreign policy, see Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and us Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufmann and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 448–82; and "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self-Restraint in American Foreign Policy," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 121–54. See Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 137–68. Christensen and Snyder argue that balance of power theory does not account for the full range of foreign policy strategies available to states. They explain the prevalence of chain-ganging behavior prior to World War I and buck-passing strategies in the run up to World War II. The latter is more attractive when leaders perceive a defensive military advantage. Jennifer Lind applies the theory to the case of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War. See Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 92–121. Buck-passing can also be predatory in a way that closely resembles bandwagoning. In this case, states align with the stronger side, but avoid contributing to the alliance while still seeking to share in the spoils of victory. See, Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107. States may also seek to buck-pass by hiding from potential threats by removing themselves from the political fray. See, Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer1994): 108–48. Randall Schweller labels this phenomenon as "predatory buckpassing," and attributes a jackal-like disposition to states that are apt to engage in it. See Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 103. William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks provide a structural understanding of balancing disincentives, focusing on the role of power preponderance (both in absolute terms and in terms of comprehensiveness), as well as coordination problems, the predominance of local threats over global threats, geographic distance, and potential aid from the system leader as factors that discourage balancing behavior. See William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41; William C. Wohlforth, "us Strategy in a Unipolar World," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002): 98–118; and Stephen M. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). The absence of empirical support for balancing propositions is highlighted by, among others, Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 249–77; John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research in Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 899–912; and T. V. Paul, "The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-First Century, ed., T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2004), 1–25. Richard Rosecrance and Paul Schroeder address the historical lack of balancing. See, respectively, Richard Rosecrance, "Is There a Balance of Power?" in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, eds., John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Saddle River, nj: Prentice Hall, 2003), 154–65; and Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). An exception is Schweller's "predatory buckpassing" behavior. The idea of bandwagoning was first presented in rough terms, and only as the antithesis of balancing behavior. Among others, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 124; and Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia," International Organization 43, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 275–316. The concept is later developed more thoroughly in order to account for profit motives, domestic political incentives, regional dynamics, and the historical record from both recent and more distant periods. See, respectively, Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In"; Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, eds., Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85–111; Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–1973," International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 369–95; Stephen R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 417–47; and Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." For bandwagoning as a form of strategic surrender, see Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 7–8. This is a matter of some debate among scholars, with Edward Mansfield showing that polarity and concentration, while related, can change independently. See Edward D. Mansfield, "Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March 1993): 105–28. These factors are discussed in greater depth in a wide range of literature on the rise and fall of great powers. For more on each factor see, respectively, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958). For more on global public goods, see Joseph S. Nye, "United States Leadership and 21st Century Global Public Goods," Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly 9, no. 2 (2009): 49–52; and Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1999). See Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 113–57; and Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds., T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2004). See John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, dc: Georgetown University Press, 2010). Joseph Grieco and Daniel Deudney explore institutional binding as a strategic choice in modern Europe and the post-independence United States, respectively. See Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787–1861," International Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 191–228; and Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21, no.1 (January 1995): 21–40. Paul Schroeder highlights the ability of states to "transcend" conflict by appealing to normative or religious common ground, and to minimize threats by making themselves economically indispensable to the stronger state through specialization and interdependence. Ja Ian Chong identifies a number of other strategic options, most notably that of buffering, which closely resembles what others called soft balancing. See Ja Ian Chong, "Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy," (Working Paper no. 54, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, November 2003); and Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment" International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7–41; Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets"; and Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006): 149–86. See Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," 180. See, respectively, T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of u.s. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 58; and Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 36. For general soft balancing arguments, see Robert J. Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 177–85; Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 7–45; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of u.s. Primacy," 46–71; and Stephen Walt, "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self-Restraint and u.s. Foreign Policy," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Applications of soft-balancing logic to more specific issues like East Asian security and un voting patterns can be found in Yuen Foong Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Strategy," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, eds., Peter J. Katzenstein and J. J. Suh Allen Carlson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); and Erik Voeten, "Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the United Nations to u.s. Dominance," Journal of Politics 66, no. 3 2004): See A. and for the World International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): that, as currently soft balancing balance of power which a structural understanding of state behavior and the tendency toward balancing as a of international relations. See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, for Soft International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): and and for In strategic hedging behavior is from traditional balancing by focusing on and argue that states engage in internal balancing when they in by their power and into military This behavior is in the form of in as a of See and for the behavior in may be driven by some of the of such economic of domestic regional security policy differences between the hedging state and the system and with domestic political French opposition to the invasion and the Sino-Russian relationship as an of soft-balancing behavior by but others that they are of policy differences or that is by economic security strategy has by those that perceive it as of a to the United States on the and those that see it as by by on are from the International Research Institute which an at Paul and others also in the of Sino-Russian and between the three countries as the of a "strategic of states that may be interested in us in See Brooks and Wohlforth, for Soft The full of can be as of the Arms at There is also in that the will their and on the international This in when of a system in favor of a system that the the For more on the between and China, see Richard China The Brooks and Wohlforth, for Soft has China as the of and has also more systems like the are from Brooks and Wohlforth, for Soft and on from the of the Cooperation at found on the of the of Regional The relevant from the in into account the of the military of the in the states of the it for the in the to on the for the use of the and the of military on the of See Cooperation Organization New no. the on 4 See of the and See Regional of Cooperation Organization on Foreign of Foreign May of the in as the and of See South us See Stephen in Among and that the was to to the 2010 in This upon the ability of the to on in the because the while members and in on to the the from the was only the support of state and and general to provide the with support and assistance in this For full of the see of of State See and for on military as a of are from the World 2010 World Development Russia, World 2010 World Development China, See Alliances by Russia, China After a that the and the in that to with on the are to with See A New of International at Meeting of Cooperation Organization of of For of and to the military see China The of in Asia and the of a strategic and the of with a wide range of countries like and are to in the that the are This result from a us this it is A or from an in or that the of us from the this it is A of security strategy as an of both A and strategic hedging behavior can be found in Brock F. Tessman and "Great Powers and Strategic The Case of International Studies Review 13, no. 2 (June The role of the is by of State the will not the from or against See W. James D. and E. and (New York: on Foreign For more on the see Powers: and the New on the no. and Regional Security and the World in the of on 2 November into on when the state to the The as a of regional The and The For on the of us in the see John in of an to New Political Science 29, no. 2 (June It should be that, during the was of the us role in the that the un should between and the and powers should be more the of and the and that it might be to act as a in the See and u.s. East November and East World Politics Review, Peter The of a New Global Power," 1 This is from on See The and in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, more approach to us is by for a for the strategy to be much more in with soft balancing than strategic The Security Strategy of the United States of May W. James and E. and (New York: on Foreign "The Power and Politics in an Foreign Affairs no. 3 to global by the United States has will because it will that certain global public goods are more See The of (New York: Press, 2004); and In of and Order (New York: 2004). Of course, us (both military and result not only in the of public goods, but also some public such as and See James and Marc Public and the The Journal of Economic no. 3 2005): and Christopher J. and E. and Global Public Of course, the us military in countries such as and a great of as For an of the from us in see the United States, and the Rise of New (New York: See Michael The Case for America as the in the Twenty-First Century (New York: For more on the approach to foreign policy under see D. "The in Foreign Policy: The Case of Center for Strategic and International Studies, Peter J. Meyer, Research See and and Future on the Strategic Research us War John and James Regional 51, no. (December For more on and Brazil's for see and Brazil's New for South Journal of International Affairs no. 2 For more on Brazil's approach to see and For a of the in to the see of in and to of 1 Foreign Affairs in to Global to Economic but on more was on the of a common South American which would be called the See and Foreign Policy Policy See and For a of between the United States and over the see War: and the over (New York: 2004). and of the French position in can be found in the of a 2003 See "The United States and the War in Center for the United States and at the May These interpretations of and can be found in Brooks and Wohlforth, for Soft T. V. Paul in "Soft Balancing in the Age of u.s. Primacy," For see, respectively, to for Military Washington on to Resolution Washington February and Washington February Alliances that emerge on will see the of strategic hedging among states. United States and for a during World War for example, a to against the For more on the as an policy against the of us see Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets"; and Barry Posen, and the of World Power," and as of the soft balancing see Brooks and Wohlforth, for Soft and for and Robert J. Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," See with to with New February French behavior to the first and be to the latter it would use of international to the United States was not a case of internal or external balancing, but it was strategic in the that it was and by the of This of of Inis distinction between and balancing. See Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962).