Main directions of Iran’s regional policy in the South Caucasus in the post-soviet period (1991– 2011)

In the context of the new geopolitical realities that emerged in the post-Soviet space after 1991, the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the direction of the South Caucasus became noticeably more active. During this period, the export ideology of the Islamic revolution became more restrained and cautious, which allowed Iran to take part in solving complex problems in the South Caucasus: in particular, at the very beginning of the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tehran offered their services in its peaceful permission. Iran’s regional strategy strictly fit into the framework of the state ideology of the «Islamic» path of development, therefore, in the course of its implementation, various tactical methods and opportunities were involved. These issues continue to arouse increased interest among domestic researchers, and their study is relevant, bearing in mind the remaining threats to Russia’s national security interests in the South Caucasus direction. The novelty of the study is determined by the fact that it contains a comprehensive analysis of the main directions of Iran’s regional policy in the South Caucasus, reveals its features and characteristics, as well as forms and methods of implementation. Particular attention is paid to issues related to the influence of internal and external factors on the complex processes of formation and development of Iran’s relations with the young states of the South Caucasus. The study found that in the course of conducting an anti-Western and, to a certain extent, independent of Russia foreign policy in the South Caucasus, Iran could not achieve noticeable success, since the influence and positions of Russia and the United States in the region remained strong. In general, the paper concludes that the hopes of Iran joining the circle of leading powers influencing the international situation in the South Caucasus were not destined to come true: in order to achieve this goal, first of all, it was necessary to strictly adhere to a pragmatic policy free from ideological layers, which was confirmed in the course of further development of events in the South Caucasus.