Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
In 1998, following Soeharto's demise, Indonesia underwent a transition from authoritarian rule amidst much anticipation but no small amoun of concern.1 Thankfully, in the intervening years, it has now become th world's third largest democracy.2 Yet, how and why the archipelago's democratic institutions became established and accepted remain difficu questions to answer. Indeed, some influential commentators voice legitimate concern about oligarchic reorganization within the new framework of democratic institutions.3 They see the ability of Soeharto-era predato interests to secure new political allies as, effectively, emasculating institution and policy reform.4 From this perspective, there has been a hijacking of the consolidation process. Highlighting these trends is an undoubtedly important task. But is it accurate to conclude that the kind of democracy establishing itself is more akin to a re-instatement of powerful constellations of state and politico-business oligarchs through new institutions? Arriving at such a conclusion would seem to rely too heavily on understanding transition dynamics as a causally contingent struggle between salient socio-economic forces.
Paul J. Carnegie (Mon,) studied this question.