Gergen versus the mainstream: Are hypotheses in social psychology subject to empirical test?

K. J. Gergen's (1982) argument that hypotheses in social psychology are not empirical propositions is critically examined and shown to be erroneous. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that, without necessarily appearing obvious, some hypotheses can be derived from propositions that are like tautologies and that their confirmation as such is of little interest. An analysis of hypotheses in recent articles in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology suggests that hypotheses derivable from propositions very much like tautologies may not be infrequent. Implications are considered for what kinds of social psychology experiments are of value to perform. Most of the criticisms of social psychology experiments have seemed to call not for radical change but only for modifications and improvements of existing approaches (for an example see E. Aronson, Brewer, Greenberg Jones, 1985). Thus, in response to ethical problems, researchers have attempted to minimize stressful treatments and the use of deception and to emphasize debriefing. Experimenter effects can be avoided by arranging for those conducting a study to be unaware of the experimental condition of the subjects. Ecological validity—when at issue—may be enhanced by making laboratory settings more realistic or by moving into the field. Efforts can be and are being made to be sensitive to the meaning of the experimental situation for the subject and to avoid obvious hypotheses that represent common sense or bubba-psychology—what one's grandmother knows already. There has, however, also been a concerted attack, spearheaded by Gergen (1982, 1985a, 1986b, 1991), against the very idea that social psychologists should undertake experimentation to test hypotheses at all. Gergen has claimed that social psychological hypotheses are not empirical propositions but merely reflect linguistic conventions. Although this claim has garnered a lively following in the social constructionist movement, the claim seems to us, as to mainstream social psychologists, erroneous. Yet we believe that something very close to Gergen's belief is true for some, though not all, hypotheses. In this article we argue that although the empirical demonstration of some hypotheses provides useful evidence for their validity, the demonstration of certain others—which need not be obvious ones—has little value. In the sections that follow, we shall take a closer look at Gergen's (1982, 1985a, 1986b, 1991) arguments and attempt to sort out the respects in which we feel he is correct from the respects