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Physical unclonable function (PUF) has been proposed as a promising and trustworthy solution to a variety of cryptographic applications. Here we propose a nonimaging-based authentication scheme for optical PUFs materialized by random scattering media, in which the characteristic fingerprints of optical PUFs are extracted from stochastical fluctuations of the scattered light intensity with respect to laser challenges, which are detected by a single-pixel detector. The randomness, uniqueness, unpredictability, and robustness of the extracted fingerprints are validated to be qualified for real authentication applications. By increasing the key length and improving the signal-to-noise ratio, the false accept rate of a fake PUF can be dramatically lowered to the order of 10^-28. In comparison to the conventional laser-speckle-imaging-based authentication with unique identity information obtained from textures of laser-speckle patterns, this nonimaging scheme can be implemented at small speckle size bellowing the Nyquist--Shannon sampling criterion of the commonly used CCD or CMOS cameras, offering benefits in system miniaturization and immunity against reverse engineering attacks simultaneously.
Wang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.