Organismic Processes for Neo‐piagetian Theories: A Dialectical Causal Account of Cognitive Development

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo‐Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho‐Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho‐dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical‐constructivist (i.e., causal‐dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo‐Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo‐Piagetian's stage theories vis‐à‐vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators ‐ a dialectical/causal theory ‐ is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage‐wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention ( M ‐capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal‐predictive power.