Children, Rights and Childhood

Children, Rights and Childhood by David Archard London : Routledge , 2004 ISBN 0415305845 , 246 pp , £16.99 (pb) Eleven years separate this book from an earlier version of it. It is now much more substantial and there is greater emphasis on children's rights, with much more attention given to the UN Convention of 1989. It is a book by a philosopher and it has the characteristic of that discipline: the argument is clear, it is well reasoned and balanced. Philosophers can often offer insights even when they traverse relatively unexplored philosophical terrain: Archard's chapter on child abuse is a case in point. He is particularly good at teasing out arguments and at assessing implications. Look, for example, at his discussion on whether children should have the vote – on this he sits on the fence – or at his analysis of why corporal punishment is not a form of child abuse. I think both of these conclusions are wrong, but I would certainly recommend those who wish to debate either of these issues to read his incisively-argued text. The book begins slowly and rather unpromisingly with a discussion of Locke. There is then an excellent appraisal of the Ariès thesis on childhood. This employs the Rawlsian distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ (Rawls, 1971). Archard explains that ‘to have a concept of ‘‘childhood’’ is to recognize that children differ interestingly from adults; to have a conception of childhood is to have a view of what those interesting differences are’. (p. 27) There are many philosophical insights like this throughout the book. The following chapter on the modern conception of childhood traces the origins of this and discusses standard luminaries, notably Freud and Piaget. It also contains an interesting passage (pp. 48–49) on J.M. Barrie's Peter Pan. Is this a magical tale of childhood innocence preserved or, as Archard argues, a social satire that most emphatically does not celebrate the possibility of eternal youth? This leaves me wishing to explore other (children's) novels of that era. Let us not forget that two of the early advocates of children's rights, Kate Douglas Wiggin and Janusz Korzcak were writing stories for children at more or less the same time. For those unfamiliar with Korzcak – sadly most of us for I had to recently recommend him to a professor of childhood history! – Betty Jean Lifton's (1988) biography is a great read. The central part of Archard's book is on children's rights and by itself would make a highly recommendable undergraduate text. There is a simple explanation of the difference between moral and legal rights, a brief tour of the Convention which rightly emphasises both Article 3 (the best interests provision) and Article 12 (which stresses that the child is a subject and not merely the object of intervention): a rational appraisal of the child liberation movement of the 1970s, with a particularly good critique of Howard Cohen's proposal for children to ‘borrow’ capacities by having representatives oddly, Richard Farson (1974), whose Birthrights is the seminal text of this movement, sometimes features as Daniel Farson!. There is a separate chapter on two of the rights of self-determination identified by Farson and the other leading proponent of liberation, John Holt, viz. voting and sexual freedom, which is particularly good on citizenship rights. Sexual choice and sexual abuse are both discussed by Archard, but the bulk of the discussion of the latter is placed 100 pages after that on sexual rights, which is, I think, a pity. In a pedagogical context there is a need to juxtapose them. The chapter on wrongdoing by children is all too brief. The impression is conveyed that the doli incapax doctrine survives, whereas in fact it was a victim to the hysteria of the Bulger case. The merits of the Scottish Children's Hearings are alluded to (pp. 130–132), but those unfamiliar with it will be left with questions unanswered. There follows a section on ‘Children, Parents, Family and State’. There is a good discussion of the right to reproduce (the ‘right to bear’, he calls it), though this pays insufficient attention to the infertile (should they be vetted when the fertile are not? Should there be a right to fertility treatment on the NHS?), and to the asymmetry between men and women (men have no say once a pregnancy has commenced). There is discussion also of the rights of parents, to rear, to autonomy and to privacy. Archard is strong on trying to tease out the justifications for parental rights. He does not discuss Hill's (1991) oft-quoted view that emphasises intention – this works particularly well where there is assisted conception – or, obviously as it came too late, the dilemma of a case like that of Evans (2005), where on a break-up of a relationship the would-be-father (that is genetic father) withdrew his consent thus frustrating his former partner's only chance of motherhood. He could devote more attention to explaining what a parent is; the significance of emphasising the ‘social’ as opposed to the ‘genetic’ for example. The licensing of parents is also usefully debated. La Follette's proposal is discussed, but Eisenberg's (1994) more thought-through prospectus is not. As already noted, this section of the book contains a good chapter on child abuse. His reasons for thinking corporal punishment is not child abuse repay study. I think he ignores too much evidence which points the other way. It is a pity there is no reference to the experience of countries which have made hitting children unlawful. He recognises the social engineering potential of such legislation, but maintains ‘it may be acceptable to do to a child what one may not do to an adult precisely because it is a child one is doing it to’ (p. 197). But this is an argument for a range of anti-child practices including child abuse. A society which does not use physical violence as a means of correction is far less likely to abuse its children physically (and, I would add, sexually). Archard's ‘Conclusion’ is packed with ideas. He puts forward, what he calls, ‘a modest collectivist proposal’. He starts from the principle that ‘the valuation and understanding of childhood and adulthood are mutually interdependent’. (p. 208) He notes ‘the character of adult society will derive from the ways in which its children are brought up’. (p. 209) Does this mean that a society which tolerates the hitting of children will become/remain one which uses violence to resolve conflict? Archard does not say. Archard goes on to spell out the values of adult society which should determine our thinking about childhood: they are equality, democracy and collectivism. And it is collectivism which is, he argues, the most crucial. His is a defence of ‘modest collectivism’. And it is an odd assortment: a universal provision of pre-school facilities, diffusion of parenting, a collective valuation of children and a significant extension of children's rights. He favours the incorporation of the UN Convention into UK law. Some countries, for example Brazil, have already done this. And we will, as we did with the European Convention on Human Rights, but it will take time – and sustained pressure. He favours a Children's Commissioner. I suspect he would not be satisfied by what England has now got. Earlier in his book, he is ambivalent about giving children the vote, but by his ‘conclusion’ he advocates lowering the age of voting, though he does not say to what. But should there any more be a minimum age than there is a maximum one? My 2-year-old granddaughter is as capable of exercising a voting choice as my 89-year-old mother, and the impact of the result will be felt more by the toddler than the old lady. This is a thought-provoking text and as such a highly recommendable read. Its audience could range from policy-makers to sixth-formers for it offers insights into one of the issues of our time – how to understand childhood. And one that requires ongoing debate.