The Development of the Application of Independent Reason in Shia Political Jurisprudence

The primary aim of this article is to critically examine and reconsider one of the fundamental conditions of the science of Uṣūl al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) in Imami jurisprudence, namely the condition of "certainty" for the validity of the rulings of independent reason, particularly in the realm of political jurisprudence. This condition, which deems the judgment of reason valid only when it is free from any possibility of error, effectively obstructs the application of reason in the context of abstruse political and social issues, reducing political jurisprudence to a "text-only" approach. Such an approach, by ignoring the broader benefits and harms that reason discerns behind political and social phenomena, ultimately leads to the inefficiency of jurisprudence and the governance system derived from it. This study seeks to provide a critical analysis of the arguments supporting the prevailing view, expand the scope of the validity of reason, and demonstrate that independent reason can serve as a reliable and effective source for deriving rulings in political jurisprudence, even without achieving philosophical certainty. Therefore, the ultimate goal is to propose an alternative principled foundation that empowers political jurisprudence to address emerging issues, adapt to contemporary needs, and overcome the challenges of analyzing social capital and inefficiency. The primary question of this research is: Can the non-certain (conjectural) judgment of independent reason be considered valid in deriving juridical rulings in the realm of political jurisprudence? This question arises from a significant tension between the theoretical foundations of the science of Uṣūl al-Fiqh and the practical needs of governmental jurisprudence. On the one hand, the prevailing tradition in Uṣūl al-Fiqh, based on arguments such as the inherent validity (ḥujjiyya dhātiyya) of certainty (yaqīn), the inability of reason to fully comprehend the criteria behind Sharia rulings, and certain hadiths, restricts the validity of reason to certain and general rulings (e.g., the goodness of justice and the evil of oppression). This perspective deems any rational judgment that involves the slightest possibility of error or oversight of conflicting factors and obstacles as invalid. On the other hand, issues in political jurisprudence—such as the structure of governance, citizens' rights, international relations, and social justice—are inherently specific, complex, and dependent on variable benefits and harms, making the attainment of philosophical certainty in these matters nearly impossible. This profound gap presents political jurisprudence with a major dilemma: it must either remain faithful to its theoretical principles and refrain from rational engagement in these areas, leading to inefficiency, or reconsider these theoretical principles and find a way to validate non-certain rational judgments. This article aims to address and resolve this very dilemma. This article adopts an analytical-critical method and relies on library-based sources to examine the issue. The research process is structured in two main sections. In the first section, primary sources of Uṣūl al-Fiqh are consulted, and the three main reasons provided by scholars for requiring certainty in rational judgments are identified. These reasons are: (1) the inherent validity of certainty; (2) the inability of reason to fully comprehend all the rationales behind religious rulings; and (3) reliance on hadiths that negate the validity of analogy (qiyās) and personal opinion (extended to conjectural reasoning). Each of these reasons is then analyzed and critiqued individually, with a focus on their implications for political jurisprudence. In the second section, after refutingor weakening the arguments of the prevailing view, the article presents its espoused viewpoint. In this section, the article's hypothesis—that the threshold of reliability in the practice of rational agents suffices for the validity of reason—is proposed, supported by two independent arguments (one based on religious textual evidence and one on reason). First, the argument from the inherent validity of certainty is challenged, demonstrating that certainty is merely a psychological state and its discovering character (kāshifiyya) or completeness does not necessarily entail validity (i.e., muʿadhdhiriyya exculpatoriness or munajjiziyya inculpatoriness). Rather, it is reason itself that possesses inherent validity. Second, regarding the critique of the argument from reason’s inability to fully comprehend the rationales behind rulings, while it is somewhat true that reason does not fully comprehend all benefits and harms, there is no rational correlation between the possibility of error and the lack of validity. Otherwise, other valid legal conjectures and presumptions would also lose their validity. Third, the hadiths or textual evidence cited to negate the validity of reason (e.g., the hadith "Indeed, the religion of God is not attained through intellects") do not aim to deny the validity of reason but rather its definitive attainment (iṣāba) of reality, which are not necessarily correlated. Moreover, the subject of these hadiths and similar ones that negate analogy and personal opinion is not conjectural reason (ʿaql ẓannī) in an absolute sense, but rather reason that lacks reliability in the practice of rational agents (sīrat ʿuqalāʾ). That is, reason that, during the era of the presence of the Infallibles, stood in opposition to their definitive tradition. In contrast, numerous textual sources supporting the validity of reason are absolute and should not be interpreted as referring to rare cases (i.e., universal definitive reason). Their paradigmatic instance is the rationality applied in managing social and political affairs, which is deemed valid in the practice of rational agents. The article concludes that the condition for the validity of independent reason in the realm of political jurisprudence is not "certainty" in the sense of eliminating all possibility of error, but rather the threshold of reliability in the practice of rational agents. This means that a rational judgment, even if it is conjectural and concerned with particular political and social issues, is valid and authoritative as long as it is grounded in rational premises that are tenable within the discourse of rational agents. This account rests on two foundations: First, the absolute or unqualified nature of textual evidence (adilla naqliyya), including Quranic verses and hadiths, which deem reason valid in an absolute sense; restricting this to certainty lacks justification and would entail limiting it to rare cases. Second, the judgment of reason itself, which considers its non-certain findings valid in practice in the absence of stronger evidence. Therefore, in a conflict between a rational judgment deemed valid in the practice of rational beings (even if speculative) and the apparent meaning of certain texts (which are themselves speculative in their indication), preference is given to the evidence that, from a rational perspective, better indicates the intent of the Lawgiver (shāriʿ). This conclusion paves the way for an active and effective role for reason in political jurisprudence, enabling it to address complex governance issues by understanding the benefits and harms of contemporary contexts.