Uses and misuses of habituation and related preference paradigms

Abstract Houston‐Price and Nakai raise an important problem researchers face when attempting to interpret infant visual preference data. This problem stems from paradigms in which infants are only partially familiarized to a stimulus, and it is unclear whether they should show a novelty or familiarity preference to that stimulus in a subsequent test. As Hunter and Ames' (1988) noted in their important chapter, infants will sometimes show a familiarity preference rather than a novelty preference, particularly when the infants are relatively young and the stimuli are relatively complex. In this commentary, I shall make three points regarding this issue: first, that the familiarity preference problem is real; second, that in most cases there is a simple solution to the problem; and third that certain popular infant paradigms can exacerbate the problem. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.