Leading the Public To War? The Influence of American Public Opinion on the Bush Administration's Decision to go to War in Iraq

This paper examines the influence of American public opinion towards Iraq on the administration of George W. Bush from September 11, 2001 to the start of the war on March 19, 2003. It argues, first, that public opinion constrained policy choices in 2001 by requiring the administration to delay action against Iraq until it had dealt directly with al Qaeda. With the main fighting in Afghanistan completed, the administration shifted its approach. It attempted to persuade public opinion to support the use of force in Iraq, principally by using references to weapons of mass destruction to prime public opinion. Second, it suggests that the administration accurately perceived the dimensions of domestic public opinion. And third, it shows that its leadership efforts did not dramatically change public attitudes on the desirability of war although it did appear to affect public perceptions of whether the administration had ‘explained’ its position. It concludes that if the administration successfully ‘led’; the public to war, it did so in large part because, after September 11, the public favored such a war. Public opinion also caused the Congress to support the Bush administration's position. However, the emphasis on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as the reason for going to war suggests potential long-term challenges for the administration.