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THE relationship between the democratic state and other associations of its citizenry has been the subject of theorizing and philosophizing from the very beginnings of modern democratic thought in the 17th century. The early discussion focused primarily on sovereignty and natural rights-was the state the supreme sovereign association, or did it share sovereignty with other groups, particularly religious bodies? But there was also the question of desirability-was it desirable for sovereignty to be shared among several kinds of associations? Two western democratic traditions developed on this point. One, stemming from Rousseau and the French Revolution, envisions secondary associations as divisive forces, endangering equality and detracting from allegiance to the democratic state by promoting conflicting loyalties. The second, stemming from the Puritan Revolution and John Locke, sees secondary associations as cohesive forces, promoting liberty and the democratic society by serving as intermediate sources of influence between the individual and the state.1 Tocqueville, an adherent to the latter point of view, is an early source for the subsidiary thesis that secondary associations also serve the important function of drawing their participants into the life of the general society:
Herbert Maccoby (Wed,) studied this question.