Autonomous driving systems (ADSs) are reliable only when heterogeneous sensors, estimation algorithms, and safety mechanisms are engineered as a single coherent safety-critical measurement system rather than as loosely coupled modules. Production stacks integrate cameras, LiDAR, automotive radar, and GNSS/IMU, yet deployment remains constrained by modality-specific failure modes, calibration and synchronization drift, and out-of-distribution (OOD) conditions that violate modeling assumptions. These limitations induce overconfidence and downstream decision errors whenever planning assumes certainty sharper than sensing can justify. This survey introduces a sensor-centric framework linking measurement physics, uncertainty propagation, fusion integrity, safety assurance, and risk-aware planning and control. We formalize what each modality physically measures; unify probabilistic, evidential, and conformal uncertainty representations; analyze filtering, factor-graph, BEV, transformer, and state-space fusion architectures with an emphasis on robustness and graceful degradation; and generalize aviation-style integrity concepts (RAIM/ARAIM) to multi-modal autonomy. The distinctive contribution is a single sensor-to-assurance throughline in which every uncertainty representation is tied to its measurement physics, every fusion architecture is evaluated against an explicit integrity-monitoring requirement generalized from RAIM/ARAIM, and every safety-standard clause is mapped to a concrete architectural mechanism. We map these mechanisms onto ISO 26262, ISO 21448 (SOTIF), ISO/PAS 8800, ANSI/UL 4600, and the UNECE framework, and connect perception uncertainty to decision-making through chance-constrained MPC and formal safety filters (RSS, CBF). Industry case studies and emerging V2X and generative-simulation approaches close the loop to deployable safety arguments.
Iqbal et al. (Mon,) studied this question.