David Chalmers proposed a dual-aspect theory of information to tackle the hard problem of consciousness, aiming for a scientific framework. However, this approach retains elements of Cartesian dualism and its principles — structural coherence and organizational invariance — are insufficiently robust to scientifically ground subjective experiences. Chalmers’ reliance on Shannon’s information theory, which superficially addresses information from a naturalistic viewpoint, exacerbates this limitation. To overcome these challenges, J.E. Brenner’s non-standard logic (logic in reality; LIR) offers a promising avenue. LIR provides a formal qualitative description of the relationship between third-person and first-person data, addressing key issues in consciousness research. This logic can underpin a naturalistic philosophy of information, offering a transdisciplinary approach that could furnish new strategies for advancing the science of consciousness. By integrating LIR, researchers might better articulate the logical foundations necessary for a comprehensive understanding of conscious experience within a naturalistic framework.
Zhensong Wang (Mon,) studied this question.
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