This article examines two reports dated 4 October 1897 and 6 January 1898 written by the Ottoman military attaché in Madrid, Reşid bin Galib, Staff Senior Captain (Kolağası), to analyze how the late Ottoman Empire interpreted the Spanish military structure and the insurrection in Cuba. Situated within the broader development of nineteenth-century military intelligence practices, the study employs textual and contextual analysis, focusing on institutional language, strategic categorization, and threat perception. The report dated 4 October 1897 provides a detailed account of the military-administrative organization in Cuba, including command hierarchy, troop distribution, logistical infrastructure, and internal security mechanisms, while the report dated 6 January 1898 evaluates the historical trajectory of the rebellion and offers a comparative assessment of combat- and disease-related casualties, highlighting the importance of logistical and administrative capacity in warfare. Taken together, these documents show that Ottoman military intelligence systematically monitored a colonial crisis beyond Europe and interpreted it through an institutional military framework. The reports also reflect late Ottoman concerns regarding external intervention, security, and imperial stability. By examining a non-European colonial conflict, the article demonstrates how military knowledge was transferred, reframed, and integrated across imperial contexts, thereby contributing to the historiography of Ottoman military attachés and highlighting their role in shaping the Empire’s global strategic awareness at the turn of the twentieth century.
Halit BAŞ (Fri,) studied this question.