On the delegitimising force of democracy’s epistemic dysfunctions an institutional integrity account

Democratic societies display epistemic dysfunctions that obstruct the ability of citizens to act as informed and competent political decision-makers. In this paper I contend that said dysfunctions are not merely undesirable but rather undercut democratic legitimacy. However, I explain this in terms that diverge from the common instrumentalist approach, which focuses on their impact on the quality of political outcomes. I argue, instead, that said dysfunctions have delegitimizing effects because they undercut the institutional integrity of practices such as voting and political deliberation. They do so by thwarting the ability of these practices to achieve their own normative rationale: a proper joint co-authorship of political decisions by citizens. This amounts to a corrosion of the normative conditions that are meant to confer authoritativeness to democratic decision-making that is normatively significant regardless of its ultimate impact on the quality of political outcomes.