ABSTRACT Introduction The UK Infected Blood Inquiry considered events related to the transmission of pathogens via infected blood, plasma and plasma‐derived products. The report included conclusions about whether the scientific knowledge and technology could have prevented some of these infections. Aim This review offers a personal reflection from the perspective of plasma fractionation science. Methods The review is based on personal experience of developing virus‐inactivated products in the 1980s. Results It finds that although the Inquiry achieved primary purposes of recording the experiences of victims and their families and recommending that compensation be paid, it misinterpreted some of the scientific evidence. An explanation of this misunderstanding is described in terms of following aspects: the uncertain state of scientific knowledge at the time; the impracticality of using cryoprecipitate as a substitute for coagulation factor concentrates; plasma pool size; the improbability of developing virus‐inactivated coagulation factor concentrates earlier; and risk–benefit assessment challenge faced by haemophilia healthcare providers at the time. Conclusion This review offers a balance to the Inquiry's opinions about professional capabilities, which could otherwise undermine public confidence in science, discredit scientists and physicians who can no longer defend their reputations and inhibit future medical advances.
Peter A. Feldman (Tue,) studied this question.