A Reappraisal of the 1948 Inter-Korean Negotiations: Focusing on the Soviet Union’s United Front Strategy as a Strategic Determinant

The purpose of this study is to reappraise the 1948 inter-Korean negotiations through the lens of the Soviet Union’s united front strategy. Previous studies have either focused narrowly on the periods before and after the negotiations, or have treated Soviet military involvement in a somewhat fragmented manner. After Korea’s liberation, the Soviet Union pursued its communist agenda through coalition government strategies across Eastern Europe, China, and beyond, and the Korean Peninsula was no exception. The Soviets sought to exclude major right-wing factions and to establish a favorable cabinet—an archetypal united front tactic. However, the failure of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission ultimately thwarted this plan. While South Korean leaders attempted inter-Korean negotiations on the basis of ethnic solidarity, these efforts unintentionally reignited the impetus for the implementation of the Soviet united front strategy. The Soviet Union effectively dominated the negotiation process, aiming to expel the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea(UNTCOK) and to form a left-leaning government. In the end, this strategic posture by the Soviet Union failed to bring about the ideal of a unified Korean peninsula.