The following article proposes to review one of Levinas's main criticisms of Heidegger, which pertains to a sort of annulment of all alterity based on the understanding of Dasein as the being that is each time mine, interpreted by the French philosopher as an essential egoism, positioning ethics as prior to ontology, as the first philosophy. However, through the discussion of the ontological difference and Heidegger's Mitsein, we will see that, in our view, Levinas's criticism is rather situated in an ontic realm of things, unlike Heidegger, who strives to maintain his philosophical program in the ontological order. Although this work is dedicated to highlighting such differences, it does not aim to take sides with either philosopher but rather to contribute to the clarification of the thematic ground where such criticisms unfold.
Marjorie Schliebener Tobar (Fri,) studied this question.