Walter Veit’s A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness proposes a naturalistic and evolutionarily grounded account of consciousness that positions subjectivity as a biological adaptation to ecological complexity. In this commentary, I highlight the book’s potential relevance for animal welfare science, where understanding species-specific affective experiences is central. Veit’s concept of pathological complexity, the adaptive challenge of managing life-history trade-offs, provides a compelling functional rationale for the evolution of consciousness. This framework has important implications for both comparative cognition and welfare science, encouraging us to consider consciousness as a gradual and multidimensional phenomenon shaped by ecological demands. While the book’s theoretical depth may require careful reading for those outside philosophy or evolutionary biology, Veit’s openness to critique, and his use of rich biological examples make the work an important contribution. By emphasising evaluative richness as a core dimension of consciousness, Veit lays the groundwork for an empirical bridge between consciousness studies and animal welfare research. I argue that integrating his framework into welfare science could help refine our methods for assessing animal affect and agency. If consciousness evolved to guide living well, then investigating how animals thrive is not only ethically meaningful but also conceptually essential to understanding consciousness itself.
Matteo Chincarini (Fri,) studied this question.