Although anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing (CVD) measures are presented as legitimate instruments to restore fair competition in the multilateral trading system, their implementation often reveals structural imbalances and strategic distortions. This two-part study examines the extent to which certain WTO Members may be misusing these instruments for protectionist purposes. Part 1 provides a qualitative analysis of the legal and procedural flexibility embedded in the anti-dumping and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreements. It highlights the discretionary powers granted to national investigating authorities, the limits of dispute settlement oversight, and the risk of undermining the conventional balance struck in 1994. Part 2 complements this analysis with empirical data covering all AD and CVD procedures notified to the WTO between 1995 and 2023. The data show a significant concentration of measures against a limited number of targeted Members and sectors, which implies a tendency for certain Members to abuse this prerogative for purely protectionist purposes.
Antoine Comont (Mon,) studied this question.
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