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Abstract Can wars truly build states and rationalize their structures? This study focuses on the administrative origin of state-building and finds historical evidence that seems contrary to the idea of "war-making states". As states acquire more territory, they become increasingly vulnerable to setbacks in subsequent military activities, even when facing state failure or demise. Drawing upon geospatial data spanning from 906 to 969 AD during Chinas Five Dynasties and utilizing a difference-in-differences method, our study reveals that (1) states did not progressively expand in size due to continuous warfare, and (2) larger territorial acquisitions were associated with decreased probabilities of state survival, as expanding net territorial areas corresponded to higher likelihoods of state failure in the following years. (3) The relationship between civilian and military systems within a state profoundly impacts the validity of the "war-making states" hypothesis. This study highlights that war makes states more susceptible to collapse if the military system dominates the civilian bureaucracy. Conversely, if the civilian system controls the military and forms a centralized regime, the "war-making states" hypothesis holds true. These findings revise the prevailing hypothesis of "war-making states" in historical sociology, showing that the "war-making states" hypothesis depends on a specific political structure and bureaucratic system.
Li et al. (Tue,) studied this question.