There Is No Such Thing as the Separability Thesis

Abstract One commendable aspect of the ruminations by H.L.A Hart on legal positivism, which quite a few contemporary philosophers of law have not fully absorbed, is that he recognised the diversity of the points of contention that have pitted the devotees of positivism against the devotees of natural-law theories. Whereas some present-day philosophers of law are inclined to refer to “the separability thesis” of legal positivism – with the definite article “the” as a signal that there is one defining point of dispute between legal positivists and their opponents – Hart knew that there is no single such thesis. Natural-law theorists have in fact postulated numerous connections between law and morality which putatively clinch the character of law as an inherently moral phenomenon, and legal positivists have posed challenges to each of those connections or to the claim that any unchallenged connection serves to establish the inherently moral character of law.