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The subject of this article has sustained enduring interest among historians for many years and pertains to sig-nificant issues regarding the origins of the Second World War. Appraisals of the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland and Romania in historical literature vary widely, ranging from official endorsements aligning with the views of British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain and his ministers to critical evaluations. Documents of the For-eign Office’s fund of the National Archives in London presented in the article make it possible to correct much of the material published and to understand motivation of appeasers and their diplomatic combinations. The German annexation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 did not signify Britain’s abandonment of appeasement policies, contrary to the beliefs of many Western historians. Similarly, the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland and Romania did not constitute a “diplomatic revolution”. The author's analysis concludes that these guarantees aimed to placate public opinion in Western states, which advocated for a broader anti-German alliance, and were intended to deter Hitler. However, Nazi demands for full concessions akin to those at Munich were unac-ceptable. The Munich era had passed, and Hitler was resolutely intent on invading Poland, which he did on September 1, 1939. Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, but military actions were scarce on the Western Front, marking the beginning of the “Phoney War”, a conflict characterized by minimal military engagements. This was the outcome of pre-war appeasement policies towards fascist states.
A. Ivanov (Wed,) studied this question.