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This research investigates the impact of CEO power on earnings management within the framework of agency theory, considering the moderating role of audit committee effectiveness. By constructing panel data of China's listed companies during 2010-2022 and conducting empirical analysis, the GMM regression results of 11,861 samples reveal that powerful CEOs tend to implement more earnings management strategies. The research confirms agency theory's hypothesis, revealing China's audit committee effectively regulates the relationship between CEO power and earnings management. In addition, alternative measures are used in this study, and the results show that the model is robust. These results have implications for investors, managers, analysts, and policy makers, providing significant lessons about reporting quality. In addition, to test the robustness of the model, the core variables are replaced in this study, and the results show that the model is robust.
Zhang et al. (Fri,) studied this question.
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