A Tale of Two Trilemmas: Comparing the International Monetary and Financial Trilemmas

We critically analyze and compare the analytical structures of the international monetary and financial trilemmas. The first structure says that countries cannot have all three of fixed exchange rates, free capital mobility, and monetary autonomy. The second argues that countries cannot have all three of financial globalization, absence of financial crises, and financial autonomy. While the monetary trilemma is often described as being based on the Mundell–Fleming model, this is true only under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. Imperfect mobility can be caused by factors other than capital controls and in this case the constraints of the monetary trilemma need not be binding in the short run. In order to have a mechanism to provide balance of payments equilibrium, however, the theory of economic policy demonstrates that the monetary trilemma must be binding in the long run. While pointing to an important issue the financial trilemma formulation does not provide the most useful way to analyze the tradeoffs generated by financial globalization. More useful for this purpose is the literature on international externalities and public goods. We also argue that for many countries, giving up monetary autonomy will be more costly than giving up financial policy autonomy.