October 13, 2025Open Access

Matching to two sides

Key Points

A stable outcome exists in matching problems with same-side complementarity, despite utility constraints.
The study focuses on environments with both nontransferable and transferable utilities in agent cooperation.
The findings relate to pick-side matching problems and competition in online duopoly markets.
Implications of the research can inform strategies for agent cooperation and competition in digital markets.

Abstract

This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations exhibit same-side complementarity and cross-side substitutability. Our results apply to pick-side matching problems and membership competition in online duopoly markets.

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Cite This Study

Chao Huang (Sat,) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68ecfebf950606aabec092df https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2509.10942

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