Abstract Historically, the jus ad bellum and jus in bello prongs of just war theory have received the lion's share of philosophical attention. Scholars have mostly been interested in what justifies the use of military force in the first place, and the proper conduct of hostilities once war is under way. In recent years a considerable amount of work has also been devoted to questions of jus ex bello and jus post bellum. This literature asks how and when an ongoing war should be terminated, what postwar relations between the belligerents should look like, and what obligations these parties owe to one another. Relatively little attention has been given to the jus ante bellum (justice before war) prong of the just war tradition, which is said to require the adoption of policies that consolidate peace and that minimize the need for military force in the future. But what, exactly, should this be thought to proscribe? Which decisions, actions and policy settings should we regard as breaches of jus ante bellum? In this article I identify three plausible candidates: 1) reckless threats, 2) irresponsible promises and 3) the overmilitarization of defensive options. I argue that these patterns of behaviour can be regarded as breaches of jus ante bellum by virtue of showing a morally inadequate commitment to keeping the peace.
Ned Dobos (Mon,) studied this question.